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Abstract 
The convergence of Operational Technology and Information Technology is driving integration of the Internet of 
Things and Industrial Control Systems to form the Industrial Internet of Things. Due to the influence of 
Information Technology, security has become a high priority particularly when implementations expand into 
critical infrastructure. At present there appears to be minimal research addressing security considerations for 
industrial systems which implement application layer IoT messaging protocols such as Data Distribution 
Services (DDS). Simulated IoT devices in a virtual environment using the DDSI-RTPS protocol were used to 
demonstrate that enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client in both active and passive 
mode. Further, modified sequence numbers were found to be a potential denial of service attack, and malicious 
heartbeat messages were fashioned to be effective at denying receipt of legitimate messages. 
 
Keywords: Data Distribution Services, DDS, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-physical systems, Internet of Things, 
Network Security 
INTRODUCTION  
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the multitude of interconnected computers, sensors, controllers, and other 
devices which interact with the physical world. Ubiquitous computing devices are the driving force behind 
technologies such as smart electrical grids, autonomous cars, wearable health devices and home automation. 
Evans (2011) made the frequently cited prediction that the number of connected devices would surpass 50 
billion by the year 2020, however, revised predictions have forecast the number of devices to be significantly 
fewer, with Gartner, Inc. (2017) forecasting 20.8 million devices by 2020. Even with a revised prediction this is 
still a significant number of devices reinforcing the need for robust security considerations. 
Potential vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols could have serious repercussions if exploited. Whilst in 
theory industrial networks should be robust, this is not always the case, and the impact of unauthorised access or 
data modification within these networks could be quite severe. Interruptions or compromise of a power grid by 
exploiting OPC UA information transfer, intercepting personal health data through a poorly-secured CoAP-
based health tracker, or attacking a DDS-based tactical control system in a military vessel are examples of 
potential attacks which, if successful, could have serious consequences for critical infrastructure. 
Physical damage is major concern for industrial cyber-physical systems, but cyber-attacks in general are also 
creating a significant cost for organisations. IBM and the Ponemon Institute (2016) have stated in their Cost of 
Data Breach study that the average data breach in Australia comes at a cost to the breached organisation of $2.64 
million, at an average cost of $142 per stolen record. Analysing and understanding vulnerabilities in IoT 
protocols can assist organisations in evaluating how their risk appetite may influence protocol choice when 
making architectural design decisions. 
This research aims to test if identified vulnerabilities that appear to be present in parts of the DDS protocol are 
realisable. The remainder of the paper describes the security landscape for Industrial IoT systems, defines the 
experimental methodology used and discusses the findings of the research. 
SECURITY ISSUES IN IOT SYSTEMS 
Historically, protocol security has been an avenue for exploitation. For example, DNS, FTP, ICMP and EAP are 
protocols which have had vulnerabilities in their design, rather than programming errors in implementations of 
the protocols. Even recently ratified protocols such as HTTP/2 have been found to contain vulnerabilities 
(Imperva, 2016). In addition to common protocols in use on the Internet, continued research has revealed 
vulnerabilities in control systems protocols, for example BACnet (Peacock & Johnstone, 2014) and DNP3 
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(Crain & Bratus, 2015) demonstrating that continuing analysis of these protocols can reveal further weaknesses 
and reinforcing that control systems are a continued focus for security vulnerability analysis.  
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has been viewed as a cause for concern in recent times (Harp & 
Gregory-Brown, 2016). Many legacy control systems run on standards, protocols and software designed and 
implemented at a time when the threat landscape was primarily physical based, due to less interconnection 
between devices. However, in an interconnected world, ICS are gaining attention from cyber adversaries. For 
example, in 2015 Ukraine's power grid was attacked (Lee, Assante & Conway, 2016) and availability severely 
compromised after attackers gained access to SCADA systems and shut down parts of the grid. This was one of 
the first known successful cyber-attacks on power infrastructure, highlighting the growing threat of sophisticated 
attack operations against cyber-physical infrastructure.  
Data Distribution Services or DDS (Object Management Group, 2015) is an open standard primarily intended 
for peer-to-peer inter-device communications. This protocol defines a data-centric publish/subscribe model and 
is focussed on low latency communications between devices, rather than between a device and a server or 
between two servers. The specification defines DDS as: 
“… a Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) model for distributed application communication and 
integration. This specification defines both the Application Interfaces (APIs) and the Communication Semantics 
(behaviour and quality of service) that enable the efficient delivery of information from information producers to 
matching consumers.” (Object Management Group, 2015, p. 1) 
DDS has found uses in many critical environments, such as amongst the energy and aerospace industries, as well 
as the military. Wang et al. (2008) explored the use of DDS in network-centric operations and warfare systems, 
demonstrating the increased use of these protocols in environments where security is essential. This is 
unsurprising as the DDS protocol has broad usage in military applications, having originally been developed by 
Thales (2015) for use in their TACTICOS Combat Management System. This usage has been one of the primary 
drivers for the high performance and resilient design requirements of DDS. DDS defers to TLS to provide the 
bulk of security rather than providing security at the application layer. However, reliance on TLS is clearly not 
sufficient, given the creation of a standardised post-protocol ratification security specification (aptly named DDS 
Security). This additional specification provides “authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, confidentiality 
and integrity” (Object Management Group, 2016) to DDS implementations. He & Liang (2015) have analysed 
the DDS specification for security issues and put forward a scenario where unauthorised publishers or 
subscribers may be able to inject data into the DDS network or receive data not intended for the legitimate 
recipient. They present a high-level overview of theoretical attacks on DDS and it is these types of attacks that 
DDS Security has been designed to mitigate. Unfortunately, at this point there appears to be limited research on 
the effectiveness of the DDS Security specification in mitigating the defined theoretical attacks. 
Given the range of vulnerable network protocols in use in the IoT, and the associated cost of data breaches; 
further research is necessary to reduce the attack surface of critical infrastructure installations. The following 
section describes a series of laboratory experiments undertaken which aims to test a subset of vulnerabilities 
specific to the DDS protocol. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research was designed as a number of laboratory experiments. A combination of appropriate hardware and 
software resources were used to attempt to detect, capture, and then analyse specific communication used by a 
selection of devices using an implementation of the DDS protocol (DDSI-RTPS). The specific research 
questions were: 
1. What risks do vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols introduce to IIoT networks and critical 
infrastructure? 
a. Are there theoretical vulnerabilities present in the Real-Time Publish Subscribe DDS 
Interoperability Standard protocol specification? 
b. If so, can these vulnerabilities be tested with simulated IoT devices in an isolated 
environment? 
 
The hypotheses supporting the research questions and experiments designed to test the hypotheses are listed in 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses derived from research questions 
 Hypotheses 
H1: Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client. 
H2: Sequence number and heartbeat messages can be formulated to deny receipt of 
messages in a DataReader. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Experiments designed to test hypotheses 
Experiment Description Hypothesis 
E1: Participant Enumeration 
(Passive) 
To identify and enumerate RTPS participants on a network 
 
H1 
E2: Participant Enumeration 
(Active) 
To identify and enumerate RTPS participants on a network 
 
H1 
E3: Heartbeat Spoofing To deny receipt of messages to RTPS participants on a 
network 
 
H2 
Materials: 
 
The virtual lab consisted of four virtual machines, representing devices in the scenario connected by a virtual 
switch representing a DDS bus. The network topology is shown as Figure 1. All simulation and data collection 
occurred within an isolated, controlled laboratory environment, therefore the risk of unauthorised access to 
systems when testing for vulnerabilities was minimised. 
 
 
Figure 1: Scenario Network Topology 
 
 
The virtual machines are listed in Table 3. Note that RTPS participants may generally contain both DataWriters 
and DataReaders, which is the case for the attacker virtual machine in research. 
 
Table 3: Virtual machines used in experiments 
Hostname IPAddress Operating System Purpose 
DDS-client1 192.168.3.11 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Publisher) 
DDS-client2 192.168.3.12 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Subscriber) 
DDS-client3 192.168.3.13 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Subscriber) 
DDS-attacker 192.168.3.14 Kali 2017.1 Testing remote experiments (Attacker) 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Enumeration  
Information gathering is crucial for any attacker when attempting to penetrate a network, and no less so in 
industrial systems. DDSI-RTPS is reasonably verbose by default, providing reliably identifiable traffic. Figure 2 
shows the output of a Python script executed from the attacker, which successfully detects multicast RTPS SPDP 
packets transmitted on the local network segment as part of E1. The information that can be obtained from a 
single SPDP message include: Host IP address, RTPS GUID Prefix, RTPS Version, vendor ID, Time 
synchronisation information and the Contents of Submessages. 
 
Figure 2: Passive Network Scan and Enumeration Output 
In Figure 2 the Source Address, GUID prefix and overall Submessages are displayed. The result of E1 provides 
support for H1 (Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client). 
The packet capture reconstruction in 4 demonstrates the DDSI-RTPS Discovery announcement from the attacker 
(192.168.3.14) to each scanned address and the associated response. For clarity, only a small range of the 
network address space was scanned in this simulation (192.168.3.10 - 192.168.3.15). 
The packet capture has been colour coded as: 
 Yellow indicates legitimate communication between the 3 RTPS participants; 
 Red indicates traffic from the attacker; and 
 Blue indicates a response to the attacker’s discovery message. 
 
Table 4: Active Network Scan and Response Capture 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
46 12.11818 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
47 12.11818 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
49 14.00157 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
50 14.00157 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
51 14.11858 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
52 14.11859 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
53 14.16125 192.168.3.14 192.168.3.10 RTPS 206 DATA(p) 
54 14.1615 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.14 RTPS 270 INFO_TS, DATA(p) 
55 14.1615 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.14 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
 
Table 4 shows the result of an active scanning and response experiment (E2) which provides further support for 
H1 (Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client). Thus H1 is accepted, given that DDSI-
RTPS can provide reliable communications over an unreliable communication medium or best-effort protocols. 
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Denial of Service 
DDSI-RTPS uses HEARTBEAT messages sent from a DataWriter to a DataReader to indicate available 
sequence numbers on the writer so that the reader can synchronise and determine if any messages are missing. 
The reader may respond with an ACKNACK to indicate to the writer any messages which may be missing, or if 
the writer has specifically requested a mandatory ACKNACK from the reader by setting the FINAL flag in the 
HEARTBEAT message. 
 
It was theorised that advancing the sequence number state on the reader may cause the reader to miss legitimate 
messages if the reader transitioned to a state where it is expecting a higher sequence number than the writer is 
currently using. 
Initial experimentation was conducted through extracting the appropriate DDSI-RTPS HEARTBEAT message 
from a packet capture and modifying the GUID Prefix, entity ID and sequence number fields. With the altered 
GUID Prefix reference implementation, test programs stopped processing once the ‘malicious’ HEARTBEAT 
messages were sent. The experiment was repeated with varying sequence numbers. Once the legitimate 
DataWriter reached the sequence number provided by the attacker, the subscriber would recommence 
processing messages from the attacker provided sequence number, messages between the last real and attacker 
provided sequence number are not transmitted. 
 
The specification defines certain conditions in which a DataReader must treat a sequence number as invalid and 
thus the entire HEARTBEAT submessage as invalid. These conditions include: 
 Negative sequence numbers (The SequenceNumber data structure is signed, however negative sequence 
numbers are invalid); and 
 Last sequence number < first sequence number. 
In the conducted experiments, sending a negative sequence number, or sending a sequence number which is 
lower than the sequence number most recently allocated by the legitimate DataWriters had no effect on the 
processing of messages by the DataReaders. 
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Table 5 shows an extract of the packet capture taken during E3. Once the attacker (192.168.3.14) sends a 
malicious HEARTBEAT Submessage (packet 504), the DDS-client2 acknowledges the new sequence number 
(packet 505), then stops responding to the HEARTBEAT Submessages from the legitimate DataWriter 
(192.168.3.11). This result supports H2 (Sequence number and heartbeat messages can be formulated to deny 
receipt of messages in a DataReader). 
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Table 5: Network Packet Capture of HEARTBEAT Experiment 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
490 59.89478 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
491 59.89478 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
493 59.94067 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
494 59.94067 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
495 60.01186 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
496 60.01186 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
504 60.82424 192.168.3.14 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
505 60.94139 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 110 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
508 61.89489 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
509 61.89489 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
510 61.98716 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
511 61.98717 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
512 62.01184 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
 
Research question one posited, “What risks do vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols introduce to IIoT 
networks and critical infrastructure?” In relation to DDSI-RTPS, the vulnerabilities introduced could cause 
significant risk in an industrial control network. Reconnaissance is often the first task undertaken by a cyber 
adversary, results from E1 and E2 show that an attack can passively and actively survey the DDSI-RTPS network 
to discover all devices running on the bus. Modification of the sequence numbers can result in loss of message 
transmission between devices on the DDSI-RTPS network. Given the ability to forge malicious HEARTBEAT 
messages, H2 can be accepted, as a device which has received the malicious packet is prevented from processing 
further messages. Given that industrial control systems often do not directly employ network-monitoring 
software, but rather gain system insight via system specific data collection such as Trending or Polling, this type 
of attack may go unnoticed, or not identified as a cyber-attack for a duration longer than is typical of IoT based 
networks. With the acceptance of both H1 and H2, this paper argues that the introduction of vulnerable IoT 
messaging protocols into IIoT networks increases the ability of cyber adversaries to undertake reconnaissance of 
industrial control system networks, and impede the availability of critical systems operating in the network. 
CONCLUSION 
This research set out to examine security flaws in the DDS protocol (specifically, the Real-Time Publish 
Subscribe extension). There was theoretical evidence that the protocol could be suborned. The experiments 
undertaken suggest that the identified theoretical vulnerabilities are present in the Real-Time Publish Subscribe 
DDS Interoperability Standard protocol specification, answering Research Question 1a. The vulnerabilities were 
tested with simulated IoT devices in an isolated environment, with acceptance of both H1 and H2, answering 
Research Question 1b affirmatively. The experiments undertaken suggest that enumeration of IIoT devices 
communicating with DDSI-RTPS is possible by a non-authenticated client in both passive and active mode, 
respectively. Additionally, modified sequence numbers were found to be largely ineffective at preventing 
messages from reaching DataReaders. However, if a large enough sequence number is provided, in relation to 
the current sequence number, a denial of service attack is effectively achieved. Additionally, malicious heartbeat 
messages sent from an attacker device can be crafted to deny receipt of messages between a DataWriter and 
DataReader. Given these results, incorporating vulnerable IoT protocols such as DDSI-RTPS into IIoT, which 
manage critical infrastructure without mitigating the vulnerable protocol increases the risk of cyber adversaries 
conducting reconnaissance and impeding the availability of critical device-to-device network communication. 
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